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The goal of this chapter is to compare the compensation of persons 
who follow a career in the military with the compensation that similar 
individuals would expect if they were to follow a career in the civilian 
sector. While recruitment posters and television advertisements often 
emphasize the training to be had in the military, it is not common to 
base public recruitment  efforts on pay  comparisons.  And while the 
military pension system is a very important component of compensa- 
tion, it seems almost never mentioned in public recruitment efforts as 
one of the advantages of a military career. Casual observation suggests 
that many people believe that military pay is low. 
The basic approach followed in this chapter is to compare the com- 
pensation of military enlisted personnel with the compensation of high 
school graduates in the civilian sector, and to compare the compen- 
sation of  officers with the compensation of college graduates in  the 
civilian sector. Compensation is meant to include accrued Social Se- 
curity benefits and accrued pension benefits. The comparison, however, 
excludes  some forms of  compensation in  both  the civilian and the 
military sectors, such as health benefits. 
Military  salary is  taken  to be regular  military  compensation,  the 
largest component of which is basic pay, accounting for 70 percent to 
80 percent of regular military compensation. The basic allowance for 
quarters, the basic allowance for subsistence, and the federal income 
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tax advantage comprise the remaining portion of regular military com- 
pensation. The basic allowances  are paid  to members of the armed 
forces who do  not receive room or board in kind from the military. The 
federal  income tax advantage results  from  the tax-exempt  status of 
these allowances and can account for 4 percent to 8 percent of regular 
compensation. Basic pay is subject to both the federal income tax and, 
since 1957, to Social Security tax. In addition to regular military com- 
pensation, some military personnel receive additional compensation in 
the form of hazardous duty pay, submarine duty pay, and so forth, but 
on average these types of compensation are small compared to regular 
compensation. 
Until 1967, military pay was much lower than wages or salaries in 
the private sector. Under the federal Pay Comparability Act of  1967, 
however,  basic  pay  schedules along with  other elements of  regular 
military compensation must be adjusted to wage rate increases in the 
private  sector. This act mandates that military  wages be indexed  to 
wage increases in the civil service, which in turn are indexed to wages 
in the private sector. One might conclude that this indexing makes a 
comparison of military and civilian compensation a totalogical exercise, 
but the nonsalary  components of compensation are very different in 
the two sectors, even if true comparability with the civilian sector were 
maintained with  respect to regular  salary.  In addition, an important 
component of the analysis here will be the potential earnings of military 
personnel after retirement from military service. 
It is important to understand from the start that the comparison is 
not behavioral in any sense. Thus, for example, there is no analysis of 
compensating differentials or  any discussion of the compensation pack- 
age that the military must offer to recruit personnel. 
Also, it is not  possible  to make precise comparisons of potential 
earnings of identical individuals in the military versus the private sector. 
The comparisons must be taken only as indications  of the order of 
magnitude of earnings potential in the two sectors. Some sensitivity 
analysis is undertaken to determine the effect on the comparisons of 
one assumption, however. 
Section 2.1  compares age-compensation  profiles of persons in the 
military with those in the civilian sector. The general conclusion is that 
the military pension provisions mean that total compensation from a 
career in the military would typically be much higher than total com- 
pensation  in the civilian sector. Section 2.2 considers the retirement 
wealth of persons in the two sectors. The typical pension wealth of 
persons who follow a career in the military would at age sixty-two be 
two to three times as great as the pension wealth of persons who stayed 
in the civilian sector. Finally,  section 2.3 compares military pension 
accrual  profiles  with  separation rates from the  military.  Again,  the 21  Military versus Civilian Pay 
analysis is descriptive but is intended to suggest the results that would 
be obtained from more detailed behavioral analysis that will be under- 
taken in future work. 
2.1  Age-Compensation Profiles in the Military and Civilian Sectors 
In this section the procedure followed to develop age-compensation 
profiles in the civilian sector is discussed first, illustrating the idea for 
high school graduates. Then the procedure is extended to account for 
compensation of persons who follow a career in the military, using the 
career path of a typical enlisted person for illustration. Finally, com- 
pensation  profiles  and  total  compensation  for  the  two  groups  are 
compared. 
2.1.1  Civilian Age-Compensation Profiles 
The components of compensation are presented in table 2.1 for high 
school graduates. To facilitate comparison with a survey of the earnings 
of retired military personnel, all monetary values are in 1978 constant 
dollars. Column (1) is based on  1978 current population  survey data 
on the earnings of full-time employees. The estimates are based on a 
simple regression that includes age, age squared, tenure on the current 
job, tenure squared, and an age-tenure interaction term. The relevant 
parameter estimates are shown in table 2.A.  1. Tenure on the current 
job is included to facilitate calculation of private pension benefit ac- 
cruals which are typically based on years of service in a given job. The 
salary figures that are shown are based on the assumption that high 
school graduates begin work at  age twenty and stay with the same 
employer until age sixty-two. Of course this is an unrealistic assumption 
and  will  be  modified in making comparisons presented  below.  The 
profile exhibits the usual pattern of increasing real earnings until around 
the age  of  fifty, with declining real earnings thereafter.  Column  (2) 
shows accrued Social Security benefits, assuming that the receipt of 
benefits starts at age sixty-two and using a 3 percent real discount rate. 
The annual change  in  accrued  Social  Security benefits is shown in 
column (3). 
Accrued private pension wealth is shown in column (4). These figures 
are based on the provisions of a typical defined benefit pension plan.* 
Annual accruals are shown in column (5).3 The columns (6-8)  pertain- 
ing to military pension benefits and military pension wealth are blank 
of  course in  this case.  Social Security taxes are shown as negative 
 value^.^  Finally,  column  (10) shows total  cumulated compensation, 
including pension benefits and Social Security wealth. It can be seen 
in the last row of the table that typical accrued Social Security wealth 
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course not all employees in the private sector are covered by pensions, 
possibly only 60 percent are. 
2.1.2  Military Age-Compensation Profiles 
We  have  no data on average age earnings profiles in  the military. 
Thus for comparison we have selected profiles for several typical career 
paths. These paths are determined by level of final rank in the service. 
Regular military compensation is then determined by assuming typical 
promotion  ages and years of  service in rank for persons who obtain 
these final ranks. Four ranks are considered: E6, E7, E8, and E9. They 
correspond in  the army to staff sergeant, sergeant first class, master 
sergeant, and sergeant major, respectively. Illustrative data for a person 
who would reach the E8 rank is shown in table 2.2. While mandatory 
retirement rules are not written in law, they are typically observed but 
with exceptions, and the mandatory retirement ages vary from service 
to service. In the army, an E6 if not promoted would typically have to 
retire after 20 years of service, an E7 after 24 years of service, an E8 
after 27 years, and an E9 after 30 years. 
Table 2.2 assumes that retirement of an E8 occurs at twenty-seven 
years of service. Thus the salary figures in table 2.2 up to twenty-seven 
years of service, age 46, are based on regular military compensation 
schedules. At age 47  the individual is assumed to leave the service, 
and salary thereafter until age 62 represents estimated potential earn- 
ings in  the civilian sector, based  on a  1977 Department of  Defense 
retiree survey. 
The estimates are based on the earnings of retirees who were working 
full time in  the civilian sector. Sixty-four percent  of  retired enlisted 
personnel and 56 percent of retired officers were working full time at 
the time of the survey. The earnings of this group seem to be the best 
indication of  the potential  earnings of  military retirees, although the 
tendency of those with better earnings possibilities to be more likely 
to work may exaggerate the average potential earnings of retirees. This 
self-selection effect has not been accounted for in the empirical results, 
shown in table 2.A.2  for enlisted personnel and officers separately. The 
estimation equations include the same variables  used  to predict the 
earnings of  high  school and college graduates in  the civilian sector, 
plus variables that measure years of military service, education, man- 
datory retirement,  and final rank  in  the military. The initial civilian 
earnings  of  retired  military personnel are typically  lower  than  final 
military earnings. Thus for the illustrative retiree in table 2.2, civilian 
earnings at forty-seven are predicted to be $13,696, while final military 
salary was $20,724. Civilian earnings then increase, based on the es- 
timates in table 2.A.2, to $18,718 at age sixty-two. 
Since military personnel are covered by  Social Security, the two 
columns (2, 3) pertaining to Social Security are analogous to those in Table 2.2  Military Age-Compensation Profile, for a Person Who Reaches the Rank of E8 
ss  A  SS  F’rvt Pens  A F’rvt  Military  Military  A Military  ss 
Yrs of  Salary  Wealth  Wealth  Wealth  Pens Wealth  Pension  Pens Wealth  Pens Wealth  Tax  Total 
Age  Service  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
20  1 
21  2 
22  3 
23  4 
24  5 
25  6 
26  7 
21  8 
28  9 
29  10 
30  11 
31  12 
32  13 
33  14 
34  15 
35  16 
36  17 
37  18 
38  19 
39  20 


















































-  92 
-  102 
-113 
-  151 
-  160 
-  160 
~  205 
-  205 
-  237 
-  284 
-  299 
-  342 
-414 
-414 
-  426 
~  556 
-  596 
-  596 
150,955  -  666 





















450,710 Table 2.2  (continued) 
ss  ASS  Prvt Pens  A Prvt  Military  Military  A Military  SS 
Yrs of  Salary  Wealth  Wealth  Wealth  Pens Wealth  Pension  Pens Wealth  Pens Wealth  Tax  Total 
Age  Service  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
41  22 
42  23 
43  24 
44  25 
45  26 
46  27 
47  28 
48  29 
49  30 
50  31 
51  32 
52  33 
53  34 
54  35 
55  36 
56  37 
57  38 
58  39 
59  40 
60  41 









































































10,195  10,195  11,016 
11,914  1,719  11,016 
13,787  1,873  11,016 
15,823  2,036  11,016 
18,031  2,209  11,016 
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-912 
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Table 2.1. The military retiree is assumed to take a civilian job with a 
typical defined benefit pension plan like the one described above. Thus 
he also accrues private pension wealth as shown in  columns (4) and 
(5)  of table 2.2. 
Columns (6), (7), and (8) pertain to military pension benefits, pension 
wealth, and accrual rates. Vesting in the military pension system occurs 
after twenty  years  of  service.  Benefits are determined  by  years  of 
service times 2.5 percent times final military compensation. The ben- 
efits are fully indexed for inflation. Thus after twenty years of service 
a person in the military could retire at 50 percent of his final basic pay 
indexed to the consumer price index. Benefits are adjusted in March 
and September of each year. With additional years of service, benefits 
may increase at 2.5 percent per year to a maximum of 75 percent of 
basic pay. Only a very small fraction of military personnel are allowed 
to remain in the service for more than thirty years. 
After twenty years of  service, the value of  pension wealth for the 
illustrative individual in table 2.2 is almost $151,000 (in 1978 dollars). 
It increases to $213,000 after twenty-seven  years, when  the person 
must retire. At that time the person begins to receive benefits of $1 1,000 
per  year  in  real  dollars. As  pension  benefits  are received,  pension 
wealth falls. But the decline in pension wealth is not as great as the 
annual benefit, since the decline in pension wealth occurs only because 
the individual is expected to receive benefits for one less year, but this 
year is the last year of life and thus the discounted value of benefits in 
this year is relatively small. Finally, column (10) shows total cumulated 
compensation. 
From the last row of  the table, it can be seen that at age sixty-one 
this person has accrued $55,408 in Social Security wealth, $20,425 in 
private pension benefits, and $147,618 in military pension wealth. 
2.1.3  Military and Civilian Compensation Compared 
While one might argue that the compensation of persons who remain 
in the military should be compared with the compensation of civilians 
who remain in the same firm, the typical experience of  military per- 
sonnel were they to have followed a career in the civilian sector would 
not be a lifetime career with the same firm. It would not be the expected 
alternative. One might also argue that the appropriate  civilian com- 
parison should be with persons in large firms, but that also would not 
represent the typical career opportunity of military personnel were they 
to follow instead a career in the civilian sector. There probably is no 
single correct comparison. We  will maintain the comparison with the 
average high school graduate and the average college graduate, over 
all jobs and in firms of all sizes. We  rely primarily on figures that are 
based on the assumption that persons in the civilian sector have two 28  Douglas W.  Phillips/David A. Wise 
job changes, at ages twenty-nine  and forty-five, but comparisons as- 
suming no job change in the civilian sector are also presented. It may 
have been more appropriate to consider simple age-earnings profiles 
without correcting for job tenure, but as mentioned above tenure is an 
important determinant of private pension benefits. Thus this procedure 
has been followed for convenience. 
Cumulative age compensation profiles of four types of enlisted per- 
sonnel are compared with the age-compensation profile of the typical 
high school graduate in figure 2.1, assuming that the high school grad- 
uate changes jobs twice.  Notice  that average civilian  compensation 
essentially matches military compensation during the first twenty years 
of employment. This is what one might expect if indeed regular military 
compensation is indexed  to civilian  earnings.  After twenty years of 
service, however,  the value of the military  pension leads to a large 
jump in military compensation. By age sixty-two, potential cumulative 
compensation following a career in the military  is much higher than 
accrued compensation in the civilian sector. 
A comparable graph for three officer ranks, compared with civilian 
college graduates, is shown in figure 2.2. The officer ranks are 04, 05, 
and, 06, corresponding to major,  lieutenant  colonel, and colonel re- 
spectively. In this case, our predicted  civilian compensation is some- 
what lower than military  compensation even before twenty years of 
employment. In part this may result because the average job of military 
~ 
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Fig. 2.1  Comparison of cumulative earnings and pension wealth among 
four types of  enlisted men and a high school graduate who 
changes jobs two times. 29  Military versus Civilian Pay 
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Fig. 2.2  Comparison of cumulative earnings and pension wealth among 
three types of officers and a civilian college graduate who 
changes jobs two times. 
officers, matched to comparable jobs in the federal civil service, and 
in turn matched to  jobs in the civilian sector, are associated with higher 
salaries than the average job in the civilian sector. While evidence in 
Crane and Wise (1984) suggests that military enlisted personnel may 
be similar with respect to academic aptitude and other measures  of 
individual characteristics to the average high school graduate, the “abil- 
ity”  of  military officers may  on average be greater than that of the 
average college graduate. The average academic aptitude, for example, 
of persons entering the military academies is higher than that of the 
average college entrant, suggesting that the average military officer if 
he were in the private sector might have a better-paying job than the 
average college graduate in  the  civilian sector. The job change  as- 
sumption in the civilian sector may of course lead to lower predicted 
earnings than the ideal comparison would mandate. Comparable graphs 
assuming no job change in the civilian sector are shown in figures 2.3 
and 2.4 respectively. These comparisons surely overstate compensation 
in the civilian sector. 
Some additional information on the components of earnings in the 
military and  civilian sectors are shown  in figures 2.5  and 2.6.  The 
bottom line in  figure 2.5  represents  the earnings of  an officer who 
reaches the 04 rank and takes a job in the civilian sector after twenty 
years of service. The second line up shows salary earnings plus changes 
in military pension wealth which are negative after retirement. The top 
line is the latter amount plus private pension benefits and Social Se- 30  Douglas W.  Phillips/David A. Wise 
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Fig. 2.3  Comparison of cumulative earnings and pension wealth among 
four types of enlisted men and a civilian high school graduate. 
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Fig. 2.4  Comparison of cumulative earnings and pension wealth among 
three types of officers and a civilian college graduate. 
curity accruals, less Social Security taxes. The comparable information 
for a college graduate who remains in the same firm throughout his 
working life is shown in figure 2.6. The bottom line in this figure rep- 
resents salary, and the second line salary plus private pension wealth. 
The difference between the two is small but grows continuously until 31  Military versus Civilian Pay 
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Comparison of cumulative salary, cumulative salary plus mil- 
itary pension  wealth,  and total cumulative earnings of an 
officer who reaches rank 04 at retirement. 
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Fig. 2.6  Comparison of cumulative salary, cumulative salary plus pri- 
vate pension wealth, and total cumulative earnings of a typ- 
ical college graduate. 32  Douglas W.  Phill$s/David  A. Wise 
age sixty-two. The top line adds Social Security wealth less Social 
Security taxes. 
Total cumulated compensation following military versus civilian ca- 
reers is shown in table 2.3. If one assumes two job changes in the 
civilian sector, these comparisons suggest that the cumulated compen- 
sation at age sixty-two of career enlisted personnel with a subsequent 
civilian job would be 1.35 to 1.68 times the compensation of the typical 
high school graduate. The total compensation of career officers who 
assume civilian jobs upon retirement from the military would be 1.61 
to 1.93 times the total compensation of college graduates, depending 
upon military rank attained. If the comparison is with civilians who 
stay with the same employer throughout their working lives, the ratios 
are 1.14 to 1.42 for military enlisted personnel and from 1.36 to 1.63 
for officers, depending on military rank  attained. Thus while these 
numbers are far from exact, they suggest that the potential compen- 
Table 2.3  Total Lifetime Compensation of Military Personnel and Civilians, 




~  ___  ~~ 
Total Compensation 
Total  as Percent of 
Compensation  Civilian Total 
Two Job Changes in the Civilian Sector 
Enlisted 
E6  881,498  1.35 
E7  939,519  1.44 
E8  1,016,135  1.56 
E9  1,096,754  I .68 
High school grads  774,435  1  .oo 
Officers 
04  1,395,374  1.61 
05  1,506,846  1.74 
06  1,673,29  1  I .93 
College grads  865,649  1 .oo 
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sation associated with a military career is substantially greater than the 
compensation that might be expected in the civilian sector. 
2.2  Pension Wealth from Military and Civilian Careers 
The pension wealth of military personnel after twenty years of service 
is shown in table 2.4. Before twenty years of service, accrued pension 
wealth is zero; then it jumps at twenty years of  service to between 
$1 17,000 and $151,000 for enlisted personnel, depending on rank, and 
from  $260,000 to $277,000 for officers. These amounts are typically 
between 50 percent and 60 percent of total earnings during the first 
twenty years of  service. 
In comparison, the typical high school graduate with a pension plan 
described above would have $1 1,878 in accrued pension wealth after 
working twenty years. A typical college graduate would have $19,135. 
These numbers pertain to civilian workers who remain with the same 
employer for twenty years. Possibly  a better  comparison is  with  a 
civilian whose earnings are equal to the salary earnings of a person in 
the military. While a military enlisted person  who ultimately would 
attain the rank of  E9 would have accrued pension wealth after twenty 
years of  service of  $150,955, a person in the civilian sector with the 
same salary profile and who did not change jobs would have $1 1,343 
after working twenty years. The E9 when he leaves the military after 
thirty years of service would have $249,320 in pension wealth. A person 
in the civilian sector with the same salary profile would have $27,111 
in pension wealth after thirty years of  employment. 
Suppose that  the  value  of  the  pension  twenty  years  hence  were 
known and understood by potential enlistees. Then the present value 
of pension wealth twenty years hence could be considered an enlistment 
bonus. Suppose that once one enlists one is never forced to leave the 
Table 2.4  Military Pension Wealth at Vesting, by Rank at Retirement, for 
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service before twenty years, although  voluntary  separations occur. 
Then the pension  could  be considered a  sure thing  if  one chose to 
remain in the service, and foregoing this future pension wealth would 
be part of the opportunity cost of leaving the military  service. For an 
enlisted person who would ultimately reach the rank of E9, the value 
of this bonus at enlistment would be $83,302, with future pension wealth 
discounted at 3 percent. For an officer who would reach the rank 06, 
the value of the pension at enlistment would be $152,082. These seem 
like large amounts to pass up were they known. But as mentioned 
above, pension benefits seem not to be emphasized in public recruit- 
ment efforts. In addition, of course, it may be that a 3 percent discount 
rate does not capture  well individual rates of time preference. Estimated 
rates are often much higher. It is also possible that the compensating 
differential necessary to entice people to  join the military is very large. 
Subsequent discussion seems to make clear that future pension wealth 
is highly  valued by individuals that have been in the service for five 
years or more. It is likely that personnel who are in the service are 
well aware of the value of future pension benefits. 
Possibly more interesting than retirement wealth after twenty years 
of employment is retirement wealth at the age when retirement from 
the labor force is typically considered. Public and private pension wealth 
at age sixty-two of persons following a military career, compared with 
pension wealth of  high school and college graduates, is shown in table 
2.5. Annual benefits from these pension sources are shown in table 2.6. 
At age sixty-two the pension wealth of career enlisted personnel ranges 
from $157,000 to $258,000, as compared with  $1 11,000 for the typical 
high school graduate. Pension wealth of officers at this age ranges from 
Table 2.5  Public and Private Pension Wealth at Age Sixty-Two of Military 
Enlisted Men and Officers and of  High School and College Graduates 
Rank at 
Retirement or  Social Security  Private Pension  Military Pension 













































397,58  1 
135,468 35  Military versus Civilian Pay 
Table 2.6  Annual Public and Private Pension Benefits at Age Sixty-Two of 
Enlisted Men and Officers and of  High School and College 
Graduates 
Rank at 
Retirement or  Social  Private  Military 













































$263,000 to $398,000 for the three ranks we have considered, compared 
with $135,000 for the typical college graduate. Thus, potential pension 
wealth at age sixty-two is two to three times as high for military ca- 
reerists as for comparable civilians. Social Security wealth is about the 
same for military personnel as for civilians, and there is little difference 
in Social Security wealth among the military ranks considered. Private 
pension wealth is approximately twice as high for civilians as for mil- 
itary careerists. But this difference is swamped by the value of the 
military pension. Of course by age sixty-two, former military personnel 
could have been collecting pension benefits for twenty years or more. 
All of these comparisons assume no job change in the civilian sector. 
This of course, exaggerates to a substantial degree the value of pension 
wealth in the civilian sector (Kotlikoff and Wise 1983, 1984). Annual 
pension benefits shown in table 2.6 reveal comparable differences be- 
tween the military and private sector, with military total benefits two 
to three times as high as benefits from a civilian career. 
2.3  Increments to Military Pension Wealth and Retirement 
The military has maintained the need for a young, vigorous armed 
force. This goal has been reflected in mandatory retirement rules for 
at least a century. To  recruit and retain personnel in light of the man- 
datory retirement rules, with historically low salaries, in the face of 
hardship assignments, and in the face of limited postmilitary employ- 
ment opportunities, it was argued that a generous pension system was 
necessary. 36  Douglas W.  Phillips/David A. Wise 
The pension system has also been used to induce early retirement. 
The need for an early  retirement policy became evident during the 
Spanish-American and Civil wars when a large number of older officers 
prevented the military forces from operating effectively. This led to 
legislation in 1861 that authorized voluntary retirement after 40 years 
of service and mandatory retirement at 45 years.5 Legislation in  1908 
increased the requirement for voluntary retirement to 30 years of ser- 
vice.6 In  1938 the required number of years of  service to receive a 
pension was reduced to the current 20  years.’  Legislation in 1925 es- 
tablished the military pension benefits for an individual with 30 years 
of  service at the current 75 percent of  basic pay; it was argued that 
these generous retirement provisions were necessary because military 
retirees often had few other outside sources of income.8 The typical 
officer, it was argued, lost contact with family and friends, and with 
private sector employment opportunities, when he entered the military. 
Thus the pension  was  often his  sole  source of  income.  Legislation 
authorizing generous retirement benefits also recognized that military 
service entails unusual conditions of hardship, danger, and restrictions 
on personal liberty. Thus, it was argued, military employees should be 
rewarded in old age with a pension that is more generous than a private 
sector pen~ion.~  Until  1967, military wages were substantially lower 
than wages in the private sector. Hence it has been argued that the 
military relied on the pension system to attract personnel. The legis- 
lation of 1945, which established the basic framework of the officers’ 
pension system, was established to maximize the number of volunteers 
to replace World War I1 retirees.1° 
Whether these reasons remain compelling today is open to question. 
The percentage of ground combat and general duty occupations have 
decreased significantly over the past ninety years, while the percentage 
of white-collar jobs has increased. A recent survey of military retirees 
by the General Accounting Office found that current retirees had spent 
a small fraction of their total months of service in “combat related” 
occupations (Government Accounting Office 1978,lO- 11, Appendixes 
VI, V). As the military service has become more like a private sector 
job, the need for extra compensation for military service is less clear. 
While a military retiree may have had few civilian employment op- 
portunities in the past, it seems evident that that is not true today. Over 
half find private sector employment after retirement from the military 
services. All are eligible for Social Security benefits, and many also 
receive private pensions. And, while salaries in the military may have 
been much lower than those in the private sector, the earlier evidence 
demonstrates that that is not true today. Indeed, as mentioned previ- 
ously, under the federal Pay Comparability Act of  1967 salary levels 
are set to be much more in line with those in the private sector, man- 37  Military versus Civilian Pay 
dating that military wages be indexed to wage increases in the federal 
civil service, which in turn are indexed to wages in the private sector." 
With this background and the stated goals of the pension system in 
mind, we consider the apparent relationship between separation rates 
from the armed forces and the pension system. Does it serve to retain 
personnel for some number of years, say to capture returns on training 
costs, and then to encourage retirement?  Does the system seem to 
have a differential impact on some groups versus others, for example, 
those who are doing well in the service versus those who are doing 
less well? The goal here is not to assess the effects in a formal way, 
but rather to highlight the apparent major incentive effect of the pen- 
sion system. 
We  have already demonstrated the large increase in pension wealth 
at  twenty years of  service. But the salary structure also formalizes 
large increases in pay at twenty-three and twenty-six years of service. 
These salary increases induce large jumps in pension wealth at these 
years as well. To  see this, in table 2.7 pension wealth accruals by year 
of  service are shown for an enlisted man who reaches the rank of E9 
and for an officer who reaches the 06  rank. Both must retire after thirty 
years  of  service.  At  twenty-three  years  of  service, pension  wealth 
jumps by about 16 percent for both the officer and the enlisted man. 
The increase at twenty-six years of service is 12 percent for the enlisted 
person and about 11 percent for the officer. There is also a larger than 
usual increase at twenty-two years of service. This pattern is reflected 
in the accruals for other ranks as well, as long as mandatory retirement 
does not occur before these years. 
Table 2.7  Pension Wealth Accrual by  Years of Service for an Enlisted E9 and 
an Officer 06 
Enlisted Person Who  Officer Who 
Reaches Rank E9  Reaches Rank 06 
Years of  Change in  Percent  Change in  Percent 
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Total  separation rates for all reasons  are shown in  figure 2.7 for 
officers and in  figure 2.8 for enlisted personnel, by years of  service. 
The graphs show the proportion of people who are in the service after 
a given number of years who leave the service during the following 
year. They show hazard rates in more formal terminology. The reasons 
for  separation include  active-duty release, nondisability  retirement, 
disability retirement, death, and all other reasons. Active-duty release 
means  separation after completing a term of  enlistment.  It includes 
both voluntary and involuntary separations, a distinction that is often 
ambiguous.  We  have not  yet obtained these data for persons  in  the 
service less than five years. 
It is clear from the graphs that among persons who have been in the 
service for at least five years, the probability of leaving declines con- 
tinuously  until nineteen years of  service. It is  small throughout the 
period. The data is consistent with the hypothesis that as the value of 
the future pension wealth increases because the length of time to its 
availability is shorter, individuals are increasingly less likely to forego 
the pension to accept a job in the civilian sector. Thirty-two percent 
of  officers who are still in  the service leave after twenty years, while 
fully 50 percent of enlisted personnel leave after twenty years. There- 
after, there is a substantial drop in average separation rates. This pat- 
tern, of course, is what one would expect if one viewed military com- 
pensation in the form of a lifetime budget constraint with a shape similar 
to that in figures 2.1 through 2.4. 
Fig. 2.7 
Years  of  Service 
Average  military  separation rates by  years of  service  for 
officers,  1972-82.  Source: Defense Manpower Data Center. 39  Military versus Civilian Pay 
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Fig. 2.8  Average  separation rates for enlisted personnel,  1972-82. 
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center. 
These figures are averages across all men in the military and make 
no distinctions among individuals. One might expect that whether an 
individual left the military would depend on current rank and expected 
promotion in the military versus expected alternative income in a ci- 
vilian job. While doing well in the military might encourage one to stay 
there, it might also indicate greater ability than the average person in 
the military and therefore relatively better opportunities in the civilian 
sector, and thus a greater likelihood of leaving the military. On the other 
hand, persons doing poorly in the military may find it unappealing for 
the future, but doing poorly in the military may indicate that oppor- 
tunities in the civilian sector are not good either. Thus it is not clear 
what relationship one should observe between performance in the mil- 
itary and separation rates. 
The empirically observed rates by rank are shown in table 2.8 for 
enlisted personnel and in table 2.9 for officers. Again, these rates per- 
tain to total separations and make no distinction among the possible 
reasons  for leaving. The  heavy  horizontal lines  indicate mandatory 
retirement years by rank in the army. They are only suggestive because 
these limits vary by military service. In addition, while a person who 
is for example, an E5 after twelve years of  service would presumably 
have to leave at  13 years of  service if he were not promoted, he could 
be promoted in the interim and thus not be forced to leave. Horizontal 
dashed lines are drawn at the twenty-year vesting period  and at the 
two points of relatively large salary increases, twenty-three and twenty- 40  Douglas W.  PhillipslDavid A. Wise 
Table 2.8  Total Separation Rates by  Rank and Years of Service for Enlisted 
Personnel, 1972-82  Average 
Rank 
Years of 
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,395  .653  ,540  ,374 
,418  ,453  ,557  ,499 
,603  ,510 
.583  .476 
,484  .439 
,490  .448 
.574  ,422 
.565  ,407 
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,183  ,078 
.I88  ,186 
.I65  ,233 
.137  ,260 
.129  .194 
.119  ,100 
,061  ,181 
,066  ,089 
,066  ,101 
,049  ,093 
,042  .059 
,037  ,039 
,036  ,034 
,032  .055 
,079  .095 
,318  .237 
,257  ,202 
,222  ,188 
,197  ,175 
.212  ,170 
__-______- 
__________ 
,320  .213 
.414  ,202 
,355  -  .241 
,737  .749 
.686  .62  1 
six years of  service. The blanks in the table occur where there were 
fewer than twenty-five observations. Even in other cells pertaining to 
high ranks with few years of  service or to low ranks with relatively 
many years of service, the number of observations may be quite small. 
Thus the lower left triangle of  the table and the upper right triangle 
may be anomalous. 
Enlisted personnel at the lowest ranks have the highest separation 
rates for all years before pension vesting at twenty years of  service. 
The El through E3 group has higher separation rates than the E4 group, 
and this latter group in  turn has higher separation rates than the E5 
group, for virtually every year of service category.I2  Persons at the E5 
level are more likely to leave than persons at the E6 level in each year 
of service category. In part, of course, this reflects the up-or-out rule. 
For each rank there  is a large jump in  the separation rate at the 
vesting age. But the rate at this age declines continuously from a high 41  Military versus Civilian Pay 
Table 2.9  Total Separation Rates by  Rank and Years of Service, for Officers, 
1972-82  Average 
Rank 
Years of 




























,054  .158  ,117  .125  .I56  .I23 
.049  .139  ,124  .I30  .I10  ,169 
,036  ,119  ,115  ,107  ,141  . I32 
,020  ,088  ,075  ,094  ,139  ,143 
,028  ,079  ,086  .099  .124  ,116 
,034  .092  .090  ,068  .141  ,109 
,017  ,064  .099  ,050  ,107  ,124 
.011  ,046  ,126  .033  ,104  .I20 
,020  .039  ,119  .043  ,060  .08  1 
,008  ,020  ,102  .041  .031  ,081 
.010  ,049  ,107  ,045  ,025  ,050 
,002  ,030  ,089  .045  ,024  ,048 
,028  ,026  ,079  .040  ,015  ,027 
,012  .027  ,041  ,030  ,009  ,039 
.029  -  ,017  ,023  .016  ,032  .050 
,079  ,092  .354  ,528  ,283  .216 
,041  ,106  ,303  .422  ,213  .174 
,086  .117  ,225  ,297  ,185  ,126  .069 
,094  ,220  -  .269  ,214  .lo1  ,066 
,087  ,205  ,291  ,201  ,091  .07 1 
,068  .I56  ,225  ,206  .110  .065 
,172  ,185  ,260  ,246  .I80  ,078 
,187  ,246  ,210  .168  .0s  1 
.200  ,247  -  ,341  .193  ,079 
,606  ,617  ,498  .340  ,136 
,388  ,385  .426  .379  ,270 
- -  _ -  - - - -  -  _ - - - -  -  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_______________-__-------------____---- 
_____--__--____________________________ 
,211  ,314  ,336  -  .216  ,104 
of 80 percent for persons at the E4 rank to a low of 24  percent for 
those at the E9 level. Thereafter the pattern is similar, with  higher 
ranking persons less likely to leave. Thus the pattern for enlisted per- 
sonnel suggests that persons who have moved most quickly through 
the ranks are least likely to leave the military.  The only  noticeable 
exception is revealed  in the upper right-hand portion of the table; it 
shows relatively high  separation rates for persons who have moved 
very quickly through the ranks. For example, the separation rate for 
persons at the E9 level after seven years of service is 23 percent, while 
it is about 10 percent for persons at the E6 level after seven years of 
service. 
For the highest three ranks there appears to be a large increase in 
the separation rates between twenty-five and twenty-six years of ser- 
vice.  Remaining in the service from twenty-five to twenty-six  years 
increases the value of the pension by a substantial amount, while in- 42  Douglas W.  Phillips/David A. Wise 
creases thereafter are relatively  small. This possible effect does not 
seem evident between twenty-two and twenty-three years of  service, 
however. 
While these separation rates cannot tell us how many of those who 
remain after twenty years of service will remain until the mandatory 
retirement age, because the data do not allow one to follow the same 
individuals over time, the data do suggest that almost no one who is 
not promoted would remain in the service until the mandatory retire- 
ment age. For example, of those at rank E7 who remain in the service 
at twenty years, only about 32 percent would still be in the service 
after twenty-three years, according to the figures in  the column E7. 
Only  about  23  percent  of  those at  the E8  level would  remain until 
mandatory retirement at twenty-six  years  were  they  not promoted. 
Thus the pension  provisions  seem to provide a strong incentive to 
retire, at least if  the inducement of currently available benefits is not 
offset by increases in pension wealth that would result from apromotion 
were one to remain in the service. 
Separation rates for officers are shown in table 2.9 by rank and years 
of service. Compared with enlisted personnel, for officers the relation- 
ship between rank and separation rates seems much less pronounced. 
Considering only persons in ranks 03  through 06,  with less than twenty 
years of service, there is little relationship between rank and rate of 
separation, although a sharp eye might see a tendency for the separation 
rates to be higher for higher-ranking officers with few years of service, 
and a reversal of  this tendency as years of  service approach twenty. 
After the vesting age, however, it seems clear that separation rates are 
considerably lower for higher-ranking officers. For example, at twenty 
years of service the separation rates range from a high of .53 for those 
at the 04  level to a low of .22 for those at the 06  level. This pattern 
persists among those with more  years of  service.  For example, ap- 
proximately 27 percent of those at the 04  level leave at twenty-three 
years of service while only  11 percent of those at the 06  rank leave at 
twenty-three years. 
Again, it seems apparent that the available pension benefits provide 
a strong inducement to leave the service. For example, only about 30 
percent of officers who remained in the service at twenty years at the 
04  level would stay until the age of mandatory retirement at twenty- 
four years were they not promoted. Fewer than 23 percent of officers 
who were in the service after twenty years at the 06  level would remain 
until the age of mandatory retirement at thirty  years of  service were 
they not promoted in the interim. 
In short, there is a strong incentive for both officers and enlisted 
personnel to retire at twenty years of service, an incentive that provides 
a much greater effective inducement for persons at lower than at higher 43  Military versus Civilian Pay 
ranks. Even after twenty years of service, foregone pension benefits 
seem to weigh heavily against remaining in the service, if the foregone 
benefits are not offset by increased pension wealth (and salary) resulting 
from promotions in the service. 
2.4  Summary 
Potential compensation from a military career is considerably larger 
than typical enlisted personnel and officers would receive if they were 
to follow a lifetime career in the civilian sector. Total potential lifetime 
compensation of  enlisted  careerists according to our preferred  esti- 
mates is between 1.35 and 1.68 times the average lifetime compensation 
of high school graduates, depending on military rank achieved. Total 
potential compensation of officers is between  1.61 and 1.93 times the 
lifetime compensation of  the average college graduate, according to 
our preferred comparison. Because of ambiguity about the “correct” 
comparison to make, the figures cannot be considered precise, but we 
believe they reflect realistic orders of magnitude. 
Much of the difference between military and civilian compensation 
is due to the very generous military pension system. The public and 
private pension wealth at age sixty-two of career enlisted personnel 
would be between  1.5 to 2.5 times the pension wealth of the typical 
high school graduate with a private pension. Career officers at sixty- 
two would have two to three times the public and private pension wealth 
of a typical college graduate with a private pension. 
Summary descriptive data suggest that the military pension system 
provides a  strong inducement for those with five or more  years  of 
service to remain for twenty years when pension benefits are available. 
After that, available pension benefits apparently provide a strong in- 
centive to retire if  foregone benefits are not offset by  promotions in 
the service and the resulting increase in pension wealth. 
Behavioral analysis of  the effects of  military versus civilian com- 
pensation on enlistment and  separation rates will  be  the subject of 
future work. 44  Douglas W.  Phillips/David A. Wise 
Appendix 
Table Z.A.l.  Estimated Parameters of Civilian Earnings Profiles,  Based on 1978 
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Nore: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Table Z.A.2  Estimated Parameter of Civilian Earnings Profiles of Retired 
Military Personnel,  for Enlisted Personnel and Officers 
Enlisted 
Variable  Personnel  Officers 
Constant  23,593.7  -  28,786. I 
(14,214.6)  (23,299.2) 
Age  -439.9  1,948.2 
(606.1)  (894.6) 
(7.0)  (8.4) 
Tenure  562.5  281.4 
Tenure squared  -  19.9  9.4 
Years of service  -316.6  -  180.4 
Race  69.6  -47.8 
Age squared  4.5  -  19.95 
(2 13.4)  (315.7) 
(11.5)  (17.8) 
(1  45.9)  ( 127.2) 
(1,228.2)  (4,045  .O) 
Education 
High School  866.3  - 
(1.163.5) 
(I  ,230.3)  (1.156.3 
Some college  950.7  1.569.7 45  Military versus Civilian Pay 
Table 2.A.2  (continued) 
Variable 
Enlisted 
Personnel  Officers 
B.A. degree  4,476.9  3,095.3 
Grad. degree  7,508.8  4,344.7 
(1,865.5)  (1,283.1) 
(2,600.4)  (1,376.9) 
(704.3)  (870.7) 
Mandatory retirement  1,004.7  -  2,211.5 
Rank 
E6  2,438.4  - 
E7  3,716.6  - 
E8  4,232.4  - 
E9  6,654.8  - 
05  -  2,412.6 
(1,091.3) 
06  -  5,496.7 
(1,441.7) 






R2  ,066  .I06 
N  804  712 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Notes 
The computations for this chapter were completed by Maria Hanratty, and 
most of the historical information in the first part of section 2.3 is taken from 
her 1984 paper. 
1. For a detailed description  of regular military compensation, see Binkin 
1975. See also Dept. of Defense,  1976. 
2. Benefits are given by  .01  x  years of service x  average earnings in the 
last five years of employment. The plan is assumed to have ten-year cliff vesting 
and early retirement at age fifty-five, and to limit credited years of service to 
thirty. The early retirement benefit reduction is assumed to be 3 percent. For 
a detailed  discussion  of  the characteristics of  private  pension  benefits,  see 
Kotlikoff and Wise 1983 and 1984. 
3. Private pension benefit accruals are calculated assuming a 3 percent real 
discount  rate and  6 percent price  inflation.  The later figure is important in 
assessing the value of early retirement benefits. 
4.  Social Security figures are based on 1978 provisions. 
5. Act of August 3, 1861, 12 Stat. 287. 46  Douglas W.  PhillipdDavid A. Wise 
6. Act of May  13, 1908, 35 Stat. 501. 
7. Act of June 23, 1938, T. L. no. 30-379. 
8. Senate Report No. 39, 62d Cong., 1st sess., May 24,  1911. 
9. House Report No. 616, 48th Cong., 1st sess., March 4, 1884. 
10. House Report No. 943, to accompany H.R. 3951, Sept. 6, 1945. 
11. Much of this historical information is taken directly or paraphrased from 
Hanratty 1984. 
12. Unfortunately, the number of  individuals  in  each of  the cells is  not 
immediately available, but a relatively  small proportion of enlisted personnel 
would be in the lowest category after several years of service. Thus, this group 
may in some respects be an anomalous one. 
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